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The cultural dimension of power distance refers to individuals’ acceptance of power 
inequalities in society. Countries characterized by high power distance at the collective level 
face more domestic extremism. However, research has yet to examine how individual 
differences in power distance orientation may affect individuals’ intentions to engage in 
radical and violent political action. In this research, we test the hypothesis that stronger 
endorsement of power distance values makes people more prone to express the intentions to 
engage in radical and violent political action. To test the hypothesis’ generalizability across 
contexts, we sample from two countries characterized by different levels of power distance at 
the collective level, South Korea (higher power distance) and the United States (lower power 
distance). Studies 1a and 1b were surveys (Ntot = 1,214) demonstrating an association 
between power distance orientation and radical political action over and beyond other known 
predictors of political participation, including political efficacy, perceived justice, emotions 
of anger and contempt, political orientation, and social dominance orientation. In Studies 2a-
2c (Ntot = 430; 2c preregistered), priming a higher (vs lower) power distance orientation 
heightened individuals’ propensity to express the intentions to engage in radical political 
action. Theoretical implications of the findings, and future research directions, are discussed.  
 
Keywords:  
Dual Pathway Model; Power Distance Orientation; Culture; Radical and Violent Political 
Action; Extremism  
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Autocracies, alas, seldom die quietly. 
The Economist (2018, Dec. 18th) 
Individuals voice their political discontent by voting or protesting (Opp, 2009). In 
some circumstances, however, they may express it by taking part in radical and violent 
behavior (Tausch et al., 2011; van den Bos, 2018). A critical issue for psychology is to 
understand the factors that facilitate individuals’ engagement in such forms of action. 
Previous research has considered, among others, appraisals and emotional factors (Becker & 
Tausch, 2015; van den Bos, 2018). However, our understanding of how individuals’ cultural 
values might contribute to political engagement (radical or not radical) is still very limited 
(Travaglino, Abrams, & Russo, 2017; Travaglino, 2017; van Zomeren & Louis, 2017).  
In this research, we focus on the cultural dimension of power distance, the degree to 
which individuals accept inequality in society (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, Hofstede & 
Minkov, 2010). This is a particularly important dimension in the context of political 
behavior, because power distance shapes individuals’ views of, and interactions with, the 
authorities and the state. Whereas societies may differ in their collective levels of power 
distance (Hofstede et al., 2010), power distance also varies at an individual level, i.e. ‘power 
distance orientation’ (e.g., Kirkman, Chen, Farh, Chen, & Lowe, 2009).  
Thus, our goal is to investigate how individuals’ power distance orientation affects 
their intentions to engage in domestic radical and violent actions. At the country level, higher 
power distance is generally associated with the acceptance of status inequality. For instance, 
societies characterized by higher collective levels of power distance tend to have more 
authoritarian forms of government (Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart et al., 2004). Yet, as 
outlined in The Economist’s quote above, and perhaps paradoxically, political change in such 
contexts tend to be violent, often marked by revolutions where those at the top are 
overthrown through revolts (Hofstede et al., 2010). In this research, we propose and test the 
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idea that individuals’ acceptance of a high distance between them and the authority is one of 
the factors that may foster radicalism. 
Participation in Political Action and Culture 
 Individuals engage in political action to voice their discontent and pursue (or prevent) 
social change (van Zomeren, 2016). They may seek to alter the status quo by engaging in 
actions that are institutionally regulated, such as voting. Alternatively, they may use non-
institutional and non-routinized channels, such as demonstrations or petitions (Van Derth, 
2014). Both institutional and non-intuitional forms of political action imply a ‘dialogue’ 
between protesters and authorities, in which individuals use different participative means to 
express their demands (see Mendonça & Ercan, 2015).  
According to the Dual Pathway Model, two distinct pathways contribute to explain 
individuals’ political engagement (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). These 
pathways are injustice-fueled anger and efficacy. Individuals who perceive their 
circumstances as unjust are more likely to engage in political behavior aimed at changing 
those circumstances (Walker & Smith, 2002). For instance, research indicates that perceiving 
the social system as unjust elicits anger against the system, which in turn motivates people to 
confront the source of the injustice (Jost et al., 2012; Rothmund, Becker, & Jost, 2016).  
Moreover, political engagement becomes more likely when individuals believe that 
they are capable of achieving the desired social change, a concept known as efficacy (van 
Zomeren, Saguy, & Schellhaas, 2013). At the societal level, a key precursor of political 
action are feelings of efficacy about the political system, i.e. political efficacy (Balch, 1974; 
Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954). The construct of political efficacy encompasses two 
distinct domains (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991): internal political efficacy describes 
individuals’ beliefs about their ability to understand and harness the political process; 
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external political efficacy taps individuals’ perception that the political context is responsive 
to their needs and willing to listen to their demands (Niemi, et al., 1991; Lee, 2005). 
More recently, the dual-pathway model has been extended to explain participation in 
more radical forms of action (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011). Such action 
contravenes shared societal rules and may employ violence as a deliberate strategy to achieve 
a group’s goal. Previous research has demonstrated the key roles of contempt and lower 
efficacy in predicting individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent action (Tausch 
et al., 2011). In contrast to anger, feelings of contempt imply a lack of concern for future 
reconciliation and disengagement from the source of the injustice (Fischer & Roseman, 
2007). Such disengagement may result in violence, especially when individuals experience 
low efficacy and feel the political system is irresponsive to their needs (i.e., lower efficacy).  
Previous research on the dual pathway and related models has mainly focused on the 
instrumental (i.e., efficacy) and emotional (i.e., anger, contempt) considerations involved in 
individuals’ reactions to perceived injustice and collective disadvantage (van Zomeren, 
Leach, & Spears, 2012). Not much psychological research has so far examined the role of 
cultural values in shaping individuals’ political engagement (e.g., Fischer, Becker, Kito, & 
Nayir, 2017; Travaglino, 2017; Travaglino & Abrams, 2019). Nonetheless, cultural values 
shape individuals’ responses and perceptions in a variety of domains (Freeman, Rule, & 
Ambady, 2009; Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Oyserman & Uskul, 2008). It is likely they also 
inform individuals’ decisions about political action.   
In general terms, culture can be conceptualized as ‘shared meaning’ that structures 
and shapes individuals’ perception (Bruner, 1990). Culture organizes basic perceptual 
processes as well as providing lenses through which examining and understanding social 
reality. For instance, according to Geertz (1964), culture is an ordered system of complex 
symbols that provides individuals with ‘maps’ signposting what is important in the world 
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around them. These ‘maps’ help people orient themselves, indicating what actions are 
appropriate and what should instead be avoided (see also Brewer & Yuki, 2014; Travaglino 
& Abrams, 2019; Triandis, 2001).  
Applied to the political sphere, thus, cultural values may represent a key third route – 
beyond instrumental and emotional ones – driving individuals’ decisions about engagement 
(Travaglino, 2017). Specifically, because they bestow meaning on individuals’ social world, 
cultural values may inform individuals about what types of political responses are appropriate 
or necessary to express their grievances, and pursue social change (cf. Travaglino & Drury, 
2019). In this article, we focus on power distance orientation and examine how this culturally 
rooted cluster of values and views of authority shape individuals’ political engagement. 
Power Distance Orientation and Political Action 
Power distance is defined as “the extent to which members of society accept the fact 
that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 45). 
Higher power distance societies tend to be hierarchically structured and characterized by 
subordinates’ dependence on authority figures. In contrast, lower power distance societies 
tend to be more egalitarian and characterized by interdependence between subordinates and 
authorities. Individuals within each given society may differ substantially in their power 
distance orientation (Brockner et al., 2001; Kirkman, Chen, Farh, Chen, & Lowe, 2009; Lin, 
Wang, & Chen, 2013). 
According to Hofstede et al (2010)’s theorizing, and analysis of country-level data, 
relatively higher power distance societies (e.g., South Korea) tend to be characterized by 
stronger political polarization, with the presence of one (or more) extreme political party and 
a weaker political center. In contrast, lower power distance societies (e.g., the US) are 
characterized by a stronger and moderate center (see also Hofstede, 2001). Importantly, in 
high (vs. low) power distance societies, political change takes place more violently. In line 
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with this analysis, Van De Vliert, Schwartz, Huismans, Hofstede and Daan (1999) reported a 
positive correlation between power distance and frequency of domestic political violence 
across a sample of fifty-three countries.  
Thus, higher power distance societies are generally defined by deference to authority, 
acceptance of hierarchies and differences in status. Paradoxically, they also tend to 
experience more domestic political violence, revolts and violent overthrowing of 
governments and authorities, compared to lower power distance societies (Hofstede et al., 
2010). An important research question to pose is whether these associations found at the 
macro level, across countries, can be also found at the individual level, within countries. 
We investigate this question, by testing whether individuals who are characterized by a 
stronger power distance orientation are also more likely to express the intentions to engage in 
violent forms of radical actions, compared to lower power distance individuals.  
Higher power distance individuals see power inequality as a stable and unalterable 
feature of social life (Hofstede, 1980). We, thus, reason that they may perceive social and 
political change as something that can only be obtained through violence. In contrast, lower 
power distance individuals may perceive social inequality as an undesirable feature of society 
that can be altered through other political means. Consistently with this reasoning, research in 
the organizational context indicates that powerless individuals are less likely to express their 
attitudes and thoughts in contexts perceived as more hierarchical (Anicich, Swaab, & 
Galinsky, 2015; Schaerer, Lee, Galinsky, & Thau, 2018). A stronger power distance 
orientation is associated with lower propensity to speak up in the workplace (Hsiung & Tsai, 
2017; Landau, 2009; Lin, Chen, Herman, Wei, & Ma, 2017; Khatri, 2009; Wei, Zhang, & 
Chen, 2015). This pattern can be even observed in the context of workplace interpersonal 
mistreatment, such as abusive supervision and incivility (Lin et al., 2013; cf. Moon, Weick, 
& Uskul, 2018). In addition, high power distance individuals are more likely to defer 
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important decisions to the authority because they may be more worried about the 
consequences of openly questioning powerful figures (Hsiung & Tsai, 2017; Kirkman, Chen, 
Farh, Chen & Lowe, 2009).  
Applied to political action, this evidence from organizational research suggests that 
individuals with a stronger power distance orientation may perceive they have fewer 
opportunities to voice their grievances against the authority through deliberative and 
participative political means. In high power distance societies, such perception might stem 
from actual features of the context, including lower social upward mobility or greater 
distance between higher-status and lower-status groups. However, this perception need not be 
grounded in objective reality in order to affect political behavior. It may be a correlate, or 
implication, of embracing a higher power distance orientation, regardless of the societal level 
of power distance. 
Recently, Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, and Halperin (2016) demonstrated 
that individuals who perceive the social world as less changeable are also more likely to 
engage in violent forms of political action. Similarly, there is evidence indicating that the 
perceived political marginalization (i.e., the inability to express one’s grievances) and 
repression  of groups and individuals advocating nonnormative positions may be linked to 
their radicalization, and the emergence of even more violent forms of political engagement 
(cf. Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu, & Winterbotham, 2015; Minkenberg, 
2006;Ravndal, 2018). For instance, according to the phenomenon of ‘backlashing’, state 
repression of actors pursuing social change might paradoxically contribute to an increase in 
violence (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009). This is because state repression deprives such 
actors of the channels necessary to express their demands, increasing the chances of 
retaliation (Argomaniz & Vidal-Diez, 2015; Pridemore & Freilich, 2007). Taken together, 
this evidence suggests that high power distance individuals might be more likely to voice 
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political dissent through radical and violent political action which entails disengagement from 
(rather than a dialogue with) an authority perceived as unchangeable and distant.  
Overview of Research 
The aim of this research is to examine how individuals’ power distance orientation 
might affect individuals’ intentions of engaging in violent forms of political protest. In 
Studies 1a and 1b, we test our hypotheses using two surveys analyzed with structural 
equation modeling with latent variables. We examine the role of individuals’ power distance 
orientation in the context of the dual pathway model of collective action. Specifically, we 
draw on the dual pathway model and investigate whether individuals’ endorsement of power 
distance explains radicalism beyond the psychological pathways of injustice-fueled anger and 
contempt, and low efficacy. We, thus, seek to avoid an instance of the ‘single factor fallacy’ 
(cf. Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017) by considering the contribution of power distance 
orientation in the context of the broader set of psychological constructs that are known to 
predict violent and non-violent political action. In Studies 2a-2c we adapt a priming 
procedure developed by van den Bos, Brockner, van den Oudenalder, Kamble, and Nasabi 
(2013) to experimentally manipulate the salience of power distance orientation and 
investigate whether it affects individuals’ political tendencies.  
To examine the generalizability of our findings to different contexts, we sample from 
two different societies, South Korea and the United States. Societies are characterized by 
prevalent cultural themes that constrain or promote specific values (Kitayama & Markus, 
1999). Nonetheless, there exist also substantial variations in individuals’ cultural orientations 
within societies (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2016; Triandis, 
Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Laccu, 1988). For instance, South Korea is a context where 
power distance is a prevalent and dominant cultural theme (Hofstede et al., 2010; see also 
Schwartz, 1999). In contrast, the US are characterized by relatively lower levels of power 
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distance at the collective level (Hofstede et al., 2010). Nonetheless, across both contexts, 
variations in individuals’ orientations towards inequality and authority may play a similar 
role vis-a-vis their political intentions.  
In Studies 1a-b, it was not possible to establish measurement invariance for some of 
the key constructs involved in the model.1 Thus, in this research, we do not compare directly 
samples from two different countries, and do not aim to draw inferences about the effect of 
culture at the collective level. Rather, our goal is to investigate power distance orientation at 
the individual level of analysis, within countries, in order to extend previous work conducted 
across nations (Hofstede et al., 2010). It should also be noted that, according to the 
interpretation paradox of cultural differences, differences across groups characterized by very 
distinct cultural, social and economic backgrounds might be easy to find, but are hard to 
interpret (van de Vijver and Leung, 2000; Fischer and Poortinga, 2018). This is because such 
differences can be attributed to a number of factors that do not directly pertain to culture. The 
implications of this paradox have recently led a number of authors to recommend 
comparisons among more than two cultural groups when the objective of the research is to 
establish the role of cultural differences across groups (Boer, Hanke, & He, 2018; Fischer and 
Poortinga, 2018). Nevertheless, sampling from the two national groups of South Korea and 
the US enables us to test the generalizability of our findings across different societies. Thus, 
in the following studies, we draw on samples from two different geographical, social and 
economic contexts to investigate the generalizability of the effect of power distance 
orientation on radical and violent political action.  
Studies 1a-1b 
In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigate the association between power distance 
orientation and intentions to engage in radical and violent political protest in the context of 
van Zomeren et al. (2004)’s dual-pathway model and Becker and Tausch (2015)’s extension 
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of the model to violent political participation. This approach enables us to examine the 
relative weight of the power distance cultural orientation vis-à-vis other predictors and foci of 
political engagement. Following previous research (e.g., Tausch et al., 2012), we also include 
measures of individuals’ intentions to engage in institutional (i.e., voting) and non-
institutional (e.g., non-violent protest) forms of political participation to examine individuals’ 
intentions to express social dissent through different political means.  
In the present studies, we examine the ‘injustice-emotions’ and ‘efficacy’ paths in 
relation to individuals’ general views and appraisal of the political system (Napier & Jost, 
2008; Solak, Jost, Sumer, & Clore, 2012; see Travaglino, 2017). Previous research has 
demonstrated that the way in which individuals perceive, construe and emotionally appraise 
social institutions and the system has important implications for their political behavior 
(Stangor & Jost, 1997; Solak, et al., 2012). Following this perspective, we measure 
individuals’ perceived justice of the system (Jost et al., 2012), their emotional responses of 
anger and contempt against the system (see Solak et al., 2012), and political efficacy. We 
include measures of both internal and external political efficacy to explore their role in 
predicting individuals’ political intentions (Balch, 1974). Moreover, we also control for 
demographic variables of gender and age. Finally, to examine the role of power distance 
orientation independently from other indicators of conservatism, across samples, we control 
for social dominance orientation (due to this construct focus on hierarchical relationships 
among groups cf. Pratto et al., 2000) and political orientation (due to the linkage between 
power distance and conservative/traditional political tendencies; Inglehart et al., 2004).  
On the basis of previous research, we hypothesize that individuals should be more 
likely to engage in non-institutional political action (i.e., non-violent participation) when they 
report a higher sense of internal efficacy and higher levels of injustice-fueled anger (Jost et 
al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2004). We also examine the indirect path from injustice to non-
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violent participation through contempt. Previous research has found no statistically 
significant associations between contempt and non-normative political action (Tausch et al., 
2011). However, differently from previous work, we investigate individuals’ emotional 
responses of contempt in relation to the political system and thus explore this path in the 
present research.  
In line with the dual pathway model, individuals’ feelings they have the ability to 
understand and harness the political process (i.e., internal efficacy) should be linked to 
heightened intentions to engage in non-violent political action (e.g., Sherkat & Blocker, 
1994). Similarly, a stronger perception that the system is responsive to one’s needs (i.e., 
external political efficacy) should be associated with stronger intentions to engage in non-
violent forms of political action. However, previous findings concerning the association 
between external efficacy and engagement in non-institutional political action are 
inconsistent. Some authors report a negative relationship between external efficacy and 
protest (e.g., Lee, 2005) whereas others found no relationship between these constructs (e.g., 
Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl, & Ardévol-Abreu, 2017). This suggests that the impact of external 
efficacy may be context dependent. In these studies, we examine this construct in both South 
Korea and the US.  
We also examine the associations between internal and external efficacy and 
individuals’ emotional responses of anger and contempt against the political system. 
Instrumental (i.e., efficacy) and emotional (anger/contempt) considerations are generally 
considered independent paths to political action. However, previous research has generally 
focused on individuals’ sense of efficacy in relation to the group to which they belong (group 
efficacy). In the present studies, we consider efficacy in the context of individuals’ appraisal 
of the political system (see Valentino, Gregorowicz, & Groenendyk, 2009; cf. Travaglino, 
2017). We expect that individuals who perceive the system as unresponsive to their needs are 
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also more likely to perceive emotions of anger and contempt against the system. These 
emotions should in turn predict stronger engagement in political action. Similarly, a stronger 
sense of internal political efficacy should be associated with stronger mobilizing emotions 
because individuals may feel more confident in their political ability to respond to the system 
(see Valentino et al., 2009).  
Concerning voting, on the basis of previous research, we expect this form of political 
engagement to be driven mainly by individuals’ perception that they are able to understand 
and harness the political process (higher internal efficacy; e.g., Moeller, de Vreese, Esser & 
Kunz, 2014). Given the institutional and system-supporting character of voting, emotions 
should play a less relevant role in individuals’ decisions about whether voting or not (Tausch 
et al., 2011; cf. also Travaglino, 2017).  
Moreover, in line with previous findings, stronger contempt should predict 
individuals’ intentions to engage in violent action (Tausch et al., 2011). Research on violent 
political engagement has yet to examine the independent effects of internal and external 
political efficacy vis-à-vis this form of participation. For instance, Tausch et al (2011; study 
3) used a generalized measure of political efficacy that included items tapping both internal 
and external efficacy and found a negative relationship between efficacy and attitudes 
towards violence in the political domain. Thus, we explore the separate role of both 
dimensions in this study. We expect that it is the sense that the system is irresponsive (rather 
than one’s self perceived ability to understand the system) that drives individuals’ 
engagement in radical and violent action. Specifically, individuals who perceive lower 
external efficacy should also feel stronger contempt towards the system, and thus be more 
likely to express the intentions to engage in radical and violent forms of political action.    
Finally, central to the aim of this paper, we test the hypothesis that higher power 
distance orientation is associated with heightened intentions to participate in radical and 
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violent political action. Power distance orientation refers to a cluster of values and meaning 
that shapes the way individuals perceive authority and inequality. Specifically, high power 
distance individuals see inequality as a stable and unalterable feature of reality. This implies 
that they might be less prone to engage in institutional and non-institutional political action 
because those forms of action imply a two-way dialogue between citizens and the authority. 
In contrast, they may see the use of violence as the only channel to obtain social change.  
Studies 1a-b’s hypotheses and predictions in relation to the different dependent 
variables are summarized in Table 1. 
Method 
Participants and procedure  
Study 1a was conducted using a convenience sample from South Korea. Six-hundred-
one participants (356 male, 244 female and 1 other; Mage = 38.36; SD = 14.83) were recruited 
for this study using Qualtrics via a Korean research company. Participants were invited to 
participate in a study on social and political issues and received a small financial incentive 
(3.60 USD, equivalent approximately to 4000 KRW). Study 1b was conducted in the US and 
included six hundred and thirteen participants (343 men, 267 women, 3 other; Mage = 33.39, 
SDage = 11.62; 79.3% of the sample was identified as Caucasian). This was a convenient 
sample recruited using Qualtrics via the online platform Prolific Academic. Participants were 
invited to take part in a study on social and political issues and compensated with a small 
financial incentive in exchange for their participation (equivalent to approximately 3 USD). 
Measures were first devised in English and then translated into Korean. Sample size 
was predetermined at six-hundred participants per country due to the availability of funds. No 
additional participants were recruited after data analysis and no participants were excluded 
from the analyses (except for deletions due to missing data). The additional participants 
included in both samples were due to unplanned oversampling from the panel companies. 
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The minimum recommended sample sizes to detect a small-to-medium effect size (δ = 0.2) in 
models with 8 latent variables and 35 manifest indicators (Study 1a) or 9 latent variables and 
39 manifest indicators (Study 1b) are, respectively, N = 444 and N = 460. The minimum 
recommended sample size for the complexity of the model structure is N = 89 across models 
(Soper, 2019; Westland, 2010).  
Materials  
Across both studies, the items were answered on 7-point scales (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree) unless differently stated below. The measures were part of a 
larger survey examining other aspects of culture and political behavior.2 Differences in the 
measures across studies are described below.   
Perceived justice of the system. Four items from Kay and Jost’s (2003) System 
Justification Scale were used to measure participants’ perception of the justice of the social 
system (e.g., ‘In general, I find South Korean [American] Society to be fair’; ‘Most of South 
Korean [American] Policies serve the greater good’; αStudy1a = .84, αStudy1b = .91). Although 
we measured individuals’ perceived justice of the system using items from the system 
justification scale, in the present studies we made no theoretical assumptions about whether 
individuals’ appraisals were a form of ‘false consciousness’ or an objective assessment of 
their circumstances (for a recent overview of system justification theory, see Jost, 2019). 
External political efficacy. External political efficacy was measured using the 
following three items, ‘The South Korean [American] government does not pay attention to 
what the people think when it decides what to do’; ‘Public officials in South Korea [America] 
do not care much about what people like me thing’ and ‘The current political system in South 
Korea [America] responds to public opinion effectively’. The last item was dropped from the 
analyses in Study 1a due to low communality with the other two (coefficient < .30). Low 
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communality did not affect the item in Study 1b. Reversed items were recoded so that higher 
scores meant higher efficacy (αStudy1a = .67, αStudy1b = .81).  
Internal political efficacy. Three items were used to measure participants’ internal 
political efficacy, ‘I have the ability to talk about and participate in public affairs’, ‘I have 
enough ability to understand political matters’ and ‘I am able to understand most political 
issues easily’ (Lee, 2005). The items formed a reliable scale across studies, αStudy1a = .89, 
αStudy1b = .89.  
 Power distance. Power distance orientation was measured using 3 items adapted 
from Yoo, Donthu, and Lenartowicz’s (2011) Cultural Value Scale (cf. also Winterisch & 
Zhang, 2014). The items were ‘People in higher positions should make most decisions 
without consulting people in lower positions’, ‘People in lower positions should not disagree 
with decisions by people in higher positions’ and ‘People in higher position should avoid 
social interaction with people in lower position’ (αStudy1a = .82, αStudy1b = .80). 
Anger. Following Travaglino (2017), participants were asked to indicate the degree 
they felt ‘angry’, ‘frustrated’, and ‘outraged’ against the political system (1 = not at all, 7 = 
extremely; αStudy1a = .90, αStudy1b = .92).   
Contempt. Following Tausch et al. (2011), we used three items to measure 
individuals’ feelings of contempt against the political system, e.g. ‘I detest our political 
system’, and ‘When thinking about our political system, I feel contempt’ (αStudy1a = .91, 
αStudy1b = .93). 
Institutional political action (Voting intentions). Participants indicated how likely 
they were to vote in the next elections (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). 
Non-institutional political participation and radical action. To measure 
individuals’ intention to take part in non-institutional and radical political action, participants 
were presented with a list of twelve items adapted from previous research (Becker, Tausch, 
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Spears, & Christ, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011), and were asked how likely they were to take 
part in each activity to express their voice and/or dissent in society (1 = very unlikely, 7 = 
very likely). Five items referred to non-intuitional participation (‘participating in a public 
demonstration’, ‘signing a petition’, ‘attending a political meeting’, ‘convincing other people 
to attend a demonstration’, ‘participating in a protest march’; αStudy1a = .85, αStudy1b = .90). 
The remaining 7 items referred to radical and violent participation, (‘throwing stones or 
bottles during a demonstration’ ‘taking part in an arson attack on private property of 
responsible groups or individuals’, ‘taking possession or blocking buildings’, ‘disturbing 
events where responsible people or groups appear’, ‘taking part in an attack on police’, 
‘blocking traffic’, ‘throwing eggs or rotten fruit at politicians’; αStudy1a = .93, αStudy1b = .90). 
Thus, our measure of political action was not focused on a specific political issue but 
encompassed different political activities aimed at expressing dissent, including the 
expression of violence against authorities (i.e., police and politicians) and radical action. 
Items were displayed in a randomized order to participants. 
Political orientation. Participants’ political orientation was measured using a single 
item, ‘Would you consider yourself a Liberal or a Conservative?’ (1 = extremely liberal, 7 = 
extremely conservative). 
Social Dominance Orientation. Four items from Pratto et al’s (2013) Short Social 
Dominance Scale were used to measure individuals’ degree of approval of group-based 
hierarchies. The items were ‘in setting priorities, we must consider all groups’, ‘we should 
not push for group equality’, ‘group equality should be our ideal’ and ‘superior groups should 
dominate inferior groups’. In Study 1a, the low internal reliability among items (αStudy1a = 
.43) suggested that SDO did not form a scale. Nevertheless, we included the item, ‘Superior 
groups should dominate inferior groups’, as a covariate in the present SEM model, based on 
its face validity. In Study 1b, the items were reliable and SDO was a covariate (αStudy1b = .90).  
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Results and Discussions 
We tested the association between power distance orientation and political 
participation, using structural equation modelling with latent variables (Figures 1a and 1b). 
Power distance orientation was added as a distinct path to all forms of political action. Data 
analyses were conducted using the R software with the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) and 
robust standard errors. Gender, age, political orientation and social dominance orientation 
were covariates in the model. Table 2 and 3 show correlations among the variables and 
descriptive statistics across studies. Across both studies, the model fit the data well in Korea, 
Study 1a: χ2 (489, N = 601) = 990.34, p < .001, CFI = .95, SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .041 
(90% CI [0.041, 0.049], p = 1.00). The fit was also adequate in the USA, Study 1b, although 
CFI was below the threshold of acceptability (cf. Hu & Bentler, 1998): χ2 (632, N = 613) = 
1996.55, p < .001, CFI = .90, SRMR =.09, RMSEA = .061 (90% CI [0.058, 0.064], p = 1.00). 
Note that χ2 was significant across both studies. Nonetheless, χ2’s strong dependence on the 
sample size makes it an unrealizable indicator of goodness of fit (Schermelleh-Engel, 
Moosbrugger, & Muller, 2003).  
Testing the effects of perceived injustice and efficacy. 
Non-violent participation. Across samples perceived anger against the system was 
negatively predicted by perceived justice, βStudy1a = -.35, SEStudy1a = 0.08, pStudy1a < .001 and 
βStudy1b = -.46, SEStudy1b = 0.09, pStudy1b < .001. In turn, anger predicted engagement in non-
violent political action in Korea, β Study1a = .14, SE Study1a = 0.05, p Study1a = .041 and the US, 
βStudy1b = .17, SEStudy1b = 0.06, pStudy1b = .011. The indirect effect of perceived justice on non-
violent political action via anger was marginally significant in Korea, β Study1a = -.05, SE Study1a 
= 0.024, p = .056 95% CI Study1a [- 0.093 to 0.001] and significant in the US, β Study1b = -.08, SE 
Study1b = 0.037, p = .015, 95% CI Study1b [- 0.162 to - 0.017].  
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Perceived justice was also negatively associated with contempt in Korea, βStudy1a = -
.40, SEStudy1a = 0.07, pStudy1a < .001, and the US, βStudy1b = -.52, SEStudy1b = 0.07, pStudy1b < .001. 
In turn, contempt predicted non-violent political action in both contexts (β Study1a = .14, SE 
Study1a = 0.06, p Study1a = .048; βStudy1b = .16, SEStudy1b = 0.07, pStudy1b = .046). This created an 
indirect effect of contempt on individuals’ engagement in non-violent action, β Study1a = -.06, 
SE Study1a = 0.03, p = .05, 95% CI Study1a [- 0.11 to - 0.001]; β Study1b = -.082, SE Study1b = 0.046, p 
= .047, 95% CI Study1b [- 0.183 to - 0.001].  
Non-violent political action was negatively predicted by internal political efficacy in 
both the Korean, β Study1a = .33, SE Study1a = 0.05, p Study1a < .001, and American, βStudy1b = .27, 
SEStudy1b = 0.06, pStudy1b < .001, samples. The effect of external efficacy was instead 
marginally significant in Korea, β Study1a = .11, SE Study1a = 0.06, p Study1a = .087, and significant 
in the US, βStudy1b = .15, SEStudy1b = 0.09, pStudy1b = .01.  
In addition, across both samples, external political efficacy was negatively associated 
with anger (βStudy1a = -.16, SEStudy1a = 0.09, pStudy1a = .02 and βStudy1b = -.20, SEStudy1b = 0.10, 
pStudy1b < .001) and contempt (βStudy1a = -.25, SEStudy1a = 0.08, pStudy1a < .001 and βStudy1b = -.25, 
SEStudy1b = 0.08, pStudy1b < .001). An inspection of the indirect effects revealed that in Korea, 
the indirect effects of external efficacy via anger and contempt were non-significant (psStudy1a 
> .08).  In the US, the indirect effect of external political efficacy on non-violent action 
through anger was significant, β Study1b = -.034, SE Study1b = 0.023, p = .034, 95% CI Study1b [- 
0.094 to - 0.004], whereas the indirect effect through contempt was marginally significant, β 
Study1b = -.04, SE Study1b = 0.031, p = .07, 95% CI Study1b [- 0.12 to 0.004]. 
Internal efficacy was significantly and positively associated with anger (βStudy1a = .10, 
SEStudy1a = 0.06, pStudy1a = .039 and βStudy1b = .14, SEStudy1b = 0.06, pStudy1b < .001) in both 
countries. The indirect effect of internal efficacy on non-violent engagement via anger was, 
however, only significant in the US, β Study1b = .023, SE Study1b = 0.02, p = .03, 95% CI Study1b 
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[0.003 to 0.06] but not in Korea (pStudy1a > .14). The association between internal efficacy and 
contempt was non-significant in Korea, βStudy1a = .05, SEStudy1a = 0.05, pStudy1a = .32, and 
marginally significant in the US βStudy1b = .07, SEStudy1b = 0.06, pStudy1b = .051. The indirect 
effects of internal efficacy through contempt were non-significant in either country (ps > .16).  
Voting. Individuals’ voting intentions were positively predicted by internal efficacy in 
either country, β Study1a = .27, SE Study1a = 0.05, p Study1a < .001 and βStudy1b = .33, SEStudy1b = 
0.09, pStudy1b < .001. In the US, there was also an unexpected association between perceived 
justice and voting intentions, βStudy1b = .20, SEStudy1b = 0.09, pStudy1b = .012. All other effects 
were non-significant, ps > .10.  
Radical and violent participation. Consistent with previous research (Tausch et al., 
2011), in Korea violent action was predicted by contempt, βStudy1a = .30, SEStudy1a = 0.07, 
pStudy1A < .001. External efficacy, βStudy1a = -.07, SEStudy1a = 0.03, 95% CIStudy1a [- 0.16, - 0.03], 
and perceived justice, βStudy1a = -.12, SEStudy1a = 0.04, 95% CIStudy1a [- 0.23, - 0.08], predicted 
violent political action indirectly, through contempt. In a similar vein, in the American 
sample, violent action was predicted directly by contempt, β Study1b = .28, SE Study1b = 0.04, p 
Study1b < .001. External efficacy, β Study1b = -.07, SE Study1b = 0.02, 95% CI Study1b [- 0.09, - 0.02], 
and perceived justice, β Study1b = -.15, SE Study1b = 0.03, 95% CI Study1b [- 0.15, - 0.05], predicted 
violent political action indirectly, through contempt. All other effects were non-significant.3  
Testing the effects of power distance orientation. Our primary objective in Studies 
1a and 1b was to investigate the association between individuals’ power distance orientation 
and individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent political action. Across both 
studies, this association was significant and positive, βStudy1a = .26, SE Study1a = 0.07, pStudy1a < 
.001 and βStudy1b = .31, SEStudy1b = 0.07, pStudy1b < .001. Specifically, in line with our 
hypothesis, across countries, the more strongly individuals embraced cultural values related 
to the acceptance of power inequalities in society, the more likely they were to report the 
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intentions to engage in radical forms of political participation to express social and political 
dissent.  
Interestingly, in the Korean sample power distance orientation was negatively and 
significantly associated with institutional political participation, βStudy1a = -.21, SEStudy1a = 
0.07, pStudy1a < .001 and non-institutional political participation, βStudy1a = -.12, SEStudy1a = 
0.05, pStudy1a = .036. In the American sample, these associations were in the same direction as 
the Korean sample but smaller and non-statistically significant βStudy1b = -.09, SEStudy1b = 0.07, 
p Study1b = .074 and βStudy1b = -.05, SEStudy1b = 0.08, pStudy1b = .379. The pattern of results in the 
Korean sample is broadly consistent with previous findings in the organizational context 
indicating that individuals with a stronger power distance orientation may be less likely to 
voice their grievances openly in society (Hsiung & Tsai, 2017). In the American sample, the 
zero-order correlations between power distance orientation and engagement in non-violent 
political action/voting were significant and in the expected directions (see Table 3). However, 
the associations between these variables were smaller and did not achieve statistical 
significance when tested controlling for other predictors.  
 
To summarize, results from two studies conducted in two different countries indicated 
that power distance orientation was linked to stronger intentions to engage in radical and 
violent forms of political participation. Across both studies, this effect was independent from 
the efficacy and injustice-fueled emotional paths, as well as individuals’ political orientation, 
social dominance orientation, gender and age.  
Studies 2a-2c 
 In Studies 2a-2c, we adapt a priming procedure from van den Bos et al. (2013) to 
examine the causal relationship between individuals’ power distance orientation and 
intentions to engage in violent forms of political protest. According to the ‘culture as situated 
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cognition’ prospective, across societies, individuals have access to different clusters of 
cultural beliefs, values, knowledge and mental schemas (i.e., cultural mindsets) that shape 
their social appraisals, judgements and behavioral responses (Oyserman, 2011; Oyserman & 
Lee, 2008). Which cultural mindset is adopted more often in a culture depends on the 
mindset’s degree of chronic accessibility. Specific contexts tend to promote (and, hence, cue 
more often) cultural mindsets that are consonant with the culture’s dominant or core values. 
Nonetheless, alternative mindsets can also be made salient. In turn, a salient mindset activates 
related cognitive content, inducing cultural dispositions that can alter judgements and 
perceptions (Oyserman, 2016).  
In Studies 2a-2c, on the basis of our theorizing and findings from Studies 1a and 1b, 
we hypothesize that priming higher power distance should heighten individuals’ intentions to 
engage in radical forms of political action. This directional hypothesis is tested using a set of 
one-tailed t-tests. In the presence of a clear directional hypothesis (i.e., H1 = μhigh power distance > 
μlow power distance), one-tailed tests provide researchers with more power to detect an effect 
(Lakens, 2016), and stronger accuracy (Cho & Abe, 2013). Due to the use of one-tailed t-
tests, we decided to run a pre-registered third study (2c, https://osf.io/ekqyx).    
Method 
Participants and design  
In study 2a, a total of 120 South Korean students were recruited using Qualtrics from 
a university in South Korea (55 men, 65 women; Mage = 22.3, SDage = 2.09). Participants 
received course credits in exchange for their participation. Study 2b included a total of 151 
American participants (78 men, 73 women; Mage = 34.85, SDage = 12.49; 82% of the sample 
self-identified as Caucasian). Study 2c included 160 participants (77 men, 80 women, 3 
unreported; Mage = 33.20, SDage = 11.95; 73% of the sample self-identified as Caucasian). 
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Participants in Studies 2b-2c were recruited using Qualtrics via the online platform Prolific 
Academic and were compensated (0.65 USD) for their participation. 
Across all studies, participants were randomly assigned to conditions. In study 2a, 
sample size depended on the size of the class where data collection was conducted. A sample 
of 120 participants enables us to detect a moderate effect d = 0.45 at 80% power and α = 0.5 
using a one-tailed t-test. The number of participants in Studies 2b and 2c were predetermined 
at 150 and 160 respectively and enabled us to detect moderate effects of d = 0.41 and d = 
0.40, respectively, at 80% power and α = 0.5 using a one-tailed t-test. Across studies, no 
participants were excluded (except for deletion due to missing cases). Below, we report all 
measures and conditions included in the studies. 
Procedure and Materials  
Procedures were identical across studies. Participants were invited to participate in a 
study on “social and political issues”. Across studies, materials were presented to participants 
through the survey software Qualtrics. Materials for Study 2a were translated in Korean 
whereas materials for Studies 2b-2c were in English. The cover story of the study, and the 
justification for presenting the measures of political engagement following the priming 
procedure was, ‘This research is designed to understand what you think about power 
differences among people, and your reactions to those differences in the social context.’  
Next, participants completed a two-task exercise adapted from van den Bos et al. 
(2013) to prime power distance orientation. This manipulation was originally devised to 
prime beliefs that run against cultural core values (vs. control) to elicit responses in cross-
cultural comparisons between countries. Because the set of studies below was not designed to 
make cross-cultural comparisons, we primed high (vs. low) power distance orientations both 
in Korea and the US. In addition, the manipulation’s original text was slightly modified to 
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improve its clarity. Modifications relative to the original text appear in square brackets 
below.  
Participants in the high power distance condition read the following instructions (van 
den Bos et al., 2013):   
 
This part of the study will focus on other people's potential to determine or 
direct your behavior. More specifically, we ask you to read some materials 
and answer some questions that ask you to imagine that you are the less 
powerful and are willing to accept that those who have power over you (e.g., 
employers, politicians, police officers, etc.) have this because of their formal, 
hierarchical position. 
 
Participants were then asked to complete the following two tasks. A minimum time of 
30 seconds was set for each task before they could proceed with the study. No maximum 
amount of time was set and participants were able to complete the task at their own pace. 
 
Please describe a situation out of your own life in which there was a large 
[social] distance between you and the person who formally had power over you. 
Thus, we ask you to imagine and describe to us a situation in which you 
were willing to accept that a person had power over you because of the 
person's formal, hierarchical position. Could you briefly describe this 
situation to us? 
 
Imagine there is a large [social] distance between you and a person who has 
power over you, thus that you are willing to accept that a person [has 
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power over you because of the person's formal, hierarchical position]. Could 
you briefly describe how you would feel in such a situation and why it may be a 
good thing when a person with power occupies this powerful position by means 
of a formal, hierarchical appointment? 
 
In the low power distance condition, participants read the following instructions and 
completed two subsequent tasks.  
 
This part of the study will focus on other people's potential to determine or direct 
your behavior. More specifically, we ask you to read some materials and answer 
some questions that ask you to imagine that you and those who have power over 
you (e.g., employers, teachers, your parents, etc.) regard each other as equals. 
Thus, formal positions do not matter so much. 
 
Please describe a situation out of your own life in which there was a small 
[social] distance between you and the person who formally had power over you. 
Thus, we ask you to imagine and describe to us a situation in which you and a 
person who formally had power over you regarded each other more or less as 
equals. Could you briefly describe this situation to us? 
 
Imagine there is a small [social] distance between you and a person who has 
power over you, thus that you and a person who formally has power over you 
regard each other more or less as equals. Could you briefly describe how you 
would feel in such a situation and why it may be a good thing when a person 
with power treats you as being equal? 
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After completing the priming task, participants completed measures of engagement in 
political action. Specifically, participants were presented with a list of twelve items 
describing different forms of political actions (as in Studies 1a and 1b). Items were preceded 
by the following instructions ‘Below there are listed a series of activities people may take 
part in to express their voice and/or dissent against the government in society. Please 
indicate how likely you would be to take part in each of these activities in the future if the 
opportunity arises’. Thus, in these studies, participants were asked to think specifically about 
engagement in political action against the government. This was done to narrow down 
participants’ focus on forms of political participation against the authority. Participants were 
also asked to indicate how likely they were to vote in the next elections.   
Items measuring individuals’ engagement in radical and violent forms of action 
(αStudy2a = .87, αStudy 2b = .97, αStudy 2c = .90) as well as other forms of non-violent political 
engagement (αStudy2a = .86, αStudy 2b = .91, αStudy 2c = .90) had good internal reliability. To 
examine whether the items loaded on the intended factors, we submitted the twelve items in 
each study to exploratory factor analyses using maximum likelihood as the method of 
extraction and oblimin rotation (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Across all studies, the scree 
plots indicated the emergence of two-factor solutions. These solutions explained 55.28% of 
the variance in Study 2a, 78.91% in study 2b and 66.98 in Study 2c. All the items loaded on 
the intended factors.  
Results and Discussions 
 Across Studies 2a-2c, one-tailed t-tests were used to examine the hypothesis that 
priming higher power distance would increase individuals’ intentions to engage in violent 
forms of political action. Results supported our hypotheses both in the sample from South 
Korea, t-test, tStudy2a (118) = 1.818, pStudy2a = .036, dStudy2a = .33 and the samples from the US, 
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tStudy2b (149) = 2.516, p = .006, dStudy2b = .41, tStudy2c (154) = 2.245, p = .013, dStudy2c = .36. 
Means and standard deviations are summarized in Table 4. Across studies, the effect of the 
manipulation on non-institutional or institutional political participation were not significant, p 
> .14 (see Table 4).  
 We used the OpenMetaAnalyst software (Wallace, et al., 2012) to integrate the effect 
size across the three studies using random-effect meta-analysis. The Cohen’s is d = .37, 95% 
CI [.18 to .56] for the effect of power distance priming on individuals’ intentions to engage in 
radical political action, d = -.11, 95% CI [-.30 to .08] for individuals’ engagement in non-
institutional political participation, and d = .03, 95% CI [-.17 to .22] for individuals’ 
engagement in institutional political action.  
General Discussion 
In this research, for the first time, we investigated the effect of individuals’ power 
distance orientation on individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent forms of 
political participation. Specifically, we hypothesized that individuals with a higher power 
distance orientation would be more likely to engage in radical forms of political action. To 
test this hypothesis, we sampled from two different societies characterized by different 
relative levels of power distance at the collective level, South Korea and the United States. 
Results from two surveys (Studies 1a and 1b) and three experimental studies (Studies 2a-2c) 
support this hypothesis in both societies. 
In Studies 1a and 1b, higher internal efficacy predicted voting intentions and, together 
with injustice-fueled anger and contempt, participation in non-violent political action (cf. van 
Zomeren et al., 2004). In contrast, only injustice-fueled contempt predicted engagement in 
violent actions (Tausch, et al., 2011). External efficacy was significantly and indirectly 
related to violent actions through contempt (cf. Travaglino, 2017). To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time that these paths have been tested in the under-investigated 
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Korean context (see Ha, Kim, & Jo, 2013; Hyun, 2015; Kim, Helgesen & Ahn. 2002). 
Findings from Study 1a (South Korea) indicate that the injustice-fueled emotional and 
efficacy paths postulated by the dual pathway model are also key predictors of political 
participation in this novel geographical and social context. 
Importantly, supporting the research’s main hypothesis, higher power distance 
orientation was positively associated with intentions to engage in violent forms of political 
participation both in Korea and the US. This result is compatible with the idea that 
individuals’ power distance orientation has implications for their relationship with, and 
responses to authorities (cf. Hofstede et al., 2010). Specifically, individuals who accept 
unequal distributions of power as a natural feature of society are more likely to express 
intentions to voice their discontent through violent and radical means. Interestingly, in Study 
1a, power distance orientation was negatively associated with institutional and non-
institutional action. In the US these associations were smaller and did not reach statistical 
significance. This pattern of findings suggests that, at least in the Korean context, high power 
distance individuals may be less likely (or low power distance more likely) to express 
discontent through deliberative means. Findings from Korea are consonant with research 
conducted in the organizational context, which demonstrates that individuals with a higher 
power-distance orientation are less likely to voice their grievances openly (e.g., Hsiung & 
Tsai, 2017; Landau, 2009; Lin, Chen, Herman, Wei, & Ma, 2017; Khatri, 2009; Wei, Zhang, 
& Chen, 2015).     
Studies 2a-2c used a priming procedure (van den Bos et al., 2013) to test the causal 
effect of power distance on individuals’ intentions to engage in radical forms of political 
action. According to the ‘culture as situated cognition’ prospective, priming a cultural 
orientation also activates the network of beliefs, practices and appraisal orientations linked to 
that cultural dimension (Oyserman, 2011). Studies 2a-2c demonstrated that priming high (vs. 
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low) power distance orientation increased individuals’ intentions to engage in violent forms 
of political participation against the government. These findings complemented results from 
the two surveys and provide evidence of the causal role of power distance orientation vis-à-
vis violent political participation (integrated d = .37).  
However, across experiments, power distance orientation was not significantly related 
to institutional and non-institutional forms of political action and the priming procedure 
resulted in smaller effect sizes. A possible explanation for these findings is that these forms 
of political behavior are shaped by multiple, perhaps more relevant factors, including 
concerns about agency (efficacy), justice and emotions. Thus, priming the cultural orientation 
of power distance did not affect individuals’ behavioral intentions strongly. Future studies 
should examine these associations in additional contexts and situations.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present research is the first to investigate the association between power distance 
orientation and individuals’ intentions to engage in violent political action in a domestic 
context. Results from two surveys and three experiments from two different societies 
highlight the important role of this cultural dimension in explaining radical forms of political 
engagement. Nonetheless, this research was affected by some limitations. 
First, across studies we measured individuals’ general tendency to express ‘dissent in 
society’ (Studies 1a-1b) and ‘dissent against the government’ (Studies 2a-2c). This method 
has the advantage of tapping individuals’ political intentions across a vast array of different 
groups. The method focuses on the type of protest tactic rather than specific political issues. 
However, research on political behavior tends to focus on more specific contexts and 
concrete protest events (van Zomeren et al., 2014). It should be noted that Studies 1a and 1b 
replicated many of the expected findings concerning efficacy and emotions hypothesized in 
previous research (Becker & Tausch, 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2014). Nonetheless, an 
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important issue for future research is to examine the role of power distance orientation (as 
well as other cultural values) in the context of more specific groups and social problems.  
Another limitation of this research is that we did not consider the cultural level of 
analysis. Instead, we only examined how individuals’ variations in power distance within 
cultures related to individuals’ political intentions. Many of the measures employed in these 
studies did not achieve invariance across samples. This is perhaps not surprising, given that 
the majority of studies of political action in psychology have focused on western contexts 
(see van Zomeren, 2019). Novel measures sensitive to cultural differences might need to be 
elaborated to enable comparisons of individuals’ appraisal of the political system across 
contexts. Future research should explore cultural differences systematically using different 
countries characterized by different relative levels of power distance orientation. 
Future research should also examine more systematically differences between high 
power distance and low power distance individuals. For instance, future research might add a 
control condition to the priming procedure used in Studies 2a-c to examine cultural 
differences across cultures and contexts (van den Bos, et al. 2013). Moreover, latent structure 
analysis could be used to examine how the combination of different social attitudes such as 
social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 2013), or right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 
2004), together with power distance may result in different forms of political engagement 
(see Osborne & Sibley, 2017). Finally, future research should consider the role of national 
and regional identities in driving individuals’ endorsement of shared cultural orientations and 
power distance values.  
Findings from the present studies also suggest novel research avenues in the 
organizational setting. Research in organizations has examined the role of power distance 
orientation in individuals’ acceptance of injustice, submission to authority figures, or 
tolerance of limited voice (e.g., Landau, 2009; Schaerer, et al., 2009; see also Shao, Rupp, 
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Skarlicki & Jones, 2013). Yet, the present results suggest that such attitudes and behaviors 
might be paradoxically accompanied by more extreme and radical forms of dissent towards 
leaders and superiors, such as sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002) or 
engagement in destructive organizational deviance (Warren, 2003). Future research should 
examine the relationships between individuals’ power distance orientation and more radical 
responses to perceived injustice in the organizational context.  
A further important priority for future research is to examine the psychological 
mechanisms that might explain the effect of power distance orientation on individuals’ 
intentions to engage in radical forms of political participation. Below, we discuss some 
potential candidates.  
Psychological mechanisms of the “power distance orientation-radical political 
participation” nexus. This research documents the effect of power distance orientation on 
individuals’ intentions to engage in radical and violent forms of political participation. But 
what psychological mechanisms may explain this relationship? A plausible construct may be 
the degree to which high power distance individuals see the web of political relationships and 
the political system as static and unchangeable. High power distance individuals might 
perceive political power relationships in society as less likely to be altered by others. This 
could in turn lead them to perceive violence as the only way to obtain political change (cf. 
Shuman, et al., 2016). 
Additionally, the heightened propensity towards radical violence showed by high 
power distance individuals may originate directly from the feelings of lacking voice vis-à-vis 
authority. High power distance individuals are less likely to speak up, express dissent openly 
or provide feedback to individuals who are higher up in the hierarchy. In part, this is because 
they assign special qualities to authority figures. They may also feel stronger fear and anxiety 
when challenging authorities (Daniels & Greguras, 2014; Hsiung & Tsai, 2017; Kirkman, et 
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al., 2009; Kish-Gephart, Detert, Klebe Trevino, & Edmondson, 2009). For instance, research 
indicates that the negative effects of authoritarian leadership on voice behavior in 
organizations are stronger for high power distance employees (Li & Sun, 2015). In the 
political context, such lack of voice could result in high power distance individuals 
perceiving to have fewer outlets to express their grievances. This may, in turn, translate in 
violence.  
A stronger propensity towards political violence might also derive from the fact that 
power distance is associated with stronger intergroup aggression across different domains (cf. 
Weick, Vasiljevic, Uskul, & Moon, 2017). For instance, cross-country evidence indicates the 
existence of associations between countries’ power distance indices and homicide rate 
(Weick, et al., 2017), domestic political violence (Van De Vliert, et al., 1999), incivility 
(Moon et al., 2018) and aggression (Bergeron & Schneider, 2005). At the individual level, 
circumstances in which individuals see the target of dissent or even the state as ‘outgroups’, 
or de-identify from authorities, may result in a stronger push toward violence among those 
who endorse high levels of power distance orientation. 
Finally, there is evidence that chronically powerless individuals are more likely to 
seek revenge when they eventually experience power (Strelan, Weick, & Vasiljevic, 2014). 
Individuals who endorse a large social distance between the powerful and the powerless, and 
who perceive such distance as a natural feature of the environment, may similarly be more 
likely to react violently for perceived wrongs from the authority, or in order to prove their 
social worth in a context they perceive as strongly hierarchical. Violent revenge might be 
especially likely in circumstances in which they experience power, for instance when the 
authority display weakness. Future research should test this and other mechanisms that could 
explain the effect of power distance orientation on individuals’ intentions to engage in 
political violence.  
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Conclusions 
Individuals may express their dissent in different ways, ranging from casting a ballot 
to more radical and violent forms of protest. In this research, we focused on individuals’ 
power distance orientation and demonstrate that this cultural dimension plays a key role in 
individuals’ political intentions. Specifically, this research suggests that differences in 
cultural values regarding the acceptability of power inequalities in society may orient people 
towards radical means of political expressions. We hope the present work will stimulate new 
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1   We attempted to establish measurement invariance using the semTools package in R 
(Jorgensen, Pornprasertmanit, Schoemann & Rosseel, 2019). Whereas it was possible 
to establish metric invariance across samples for the measures of power distance 
orientation, perceived anger against, and justice of the system, the other constructs in 
the SEM model did not achieve invariance. Scalar invariance was not established for 
any of the constructs. Further details about these analyses can be obtained from the 
authors. 
2   The surveys also measured a number of other constructs, including social value orientation, 
horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, political trust, perceived justice 
of the economic system, relative deprivation, emotional reactions of disgust, happiness 
and shame against the political system, attitudes towards hacker groups, favorability 
towards other Asian and European countries, religiosity, identification with the national 
groups and life satisfaction. The measures of social value orientation and 
horizontal/vertical individualism and collectivism were published in Moon, Travaglino, 
and Uskul (2018) in an exploratory study unrelated to the content of the present article. 
The selection of the measures used in Studies 1a-1b was based on the theoretical 
framework of the dual-pathway model.    
3 Unexpectedly, in the Korean sample, we found a significant positive direct effect of 
perceived justice on violent action, βStudy1a = .16 SEStudy1a = 0.07, pStudy1a < .001. Surprisingly, 
individuals who perceived the system as fair were also more likely to express the intentions 
to engage in violent political action to voice their discontent. In the American sample, the 
effect was non-significant, βStudy1b = .06 SEStudy1b = 0.06, pStudy1b = .532. We explore further 
this unexpected finding with analyses presented in Appendix A. 
49 
 













































in the US 
(Yes/No) 
A higher sense that the system is unjust 
predicts stronger engagement in non-




Yes Higher internal efficacy predicts 
voting intentions. 
Yes Yes 
*Indirect effect of perceived justice of 
the system on non-violent participation 







Perceived contempt predicts stronger 
engagement in violent political 
action. 
Yes Yes 
Higher internal efficacy predicts 
stronger engagement in non-violent 
political action. 
Yes Yes A higher sense that the system is 
unjust predicts stronger engagement 
in violent political action via 
perceived contempt. 
Yes Yes 
Higher external efficacy predicts 




Yes Lower external efficacy predicts 
stronger engagement in violent 
political action via perceived 
contempt. 
Yes Yes 
Lower external efficacy predicts 
stronger engagement in non-violent 
political action via perceived anger. 
No Yes Stronger power distance orientation 
predicts lower voting intentions. 
Yes No  
† 
Lower external efficacy predicts 
stronger engagement in non-violent 
political action via perceived contempt. 
No No  
† 
Stronger power distance orientation 
predicts lower engagement in non-
institutional political action. 
Yes No 
Higher internal efficacy predicts 
stronger engagement in non-violent 
political action via perceived anger. 
No Yes Stronger power distance orientation 
predicts higher engagement in violent 
and radical political action. 
Yes Yes 
Higher internal efficacy predicts 
stronger engagement in non-violent 
political action via perceived contempt. 




Intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations for study variables (Study 1a: South Korea).  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Perceived Justice —             
2. External political efficacy .28*** —            
3. Internal political efficacy -.06 -.13** —           
4. Power distance orientation .38*** .04 -.15*** —          
5. Anger -.33**
* 
-.26*** .13** -.05 —         
6. Contempt -.41**
* 
-.33*** -.12** .01 .65*** —        
7. Voting -.18**
* 
-.09* .31*** -.33*** .11** .06 —       
8. Radical Action .27*** .06 -.08 .40*** .05 .13** -.31*** —      
9. Non-institutional participation -.05 -.01 -.32*** -.15*** .18*** .14*** .22*** .32*** —     
10. Political orientation .07 -.10* -.07 .17*** .05 .12** -.11** .04 -.16*** —    
11. Social dominance orientation .40*** .07 -.12** .52*** -.03 -.04 -.30*** .47*** -.02 .13*** —   
12. Age -.10 -.05 .14*** .05 .20*** .21*** -.02 -.06 -.11** .15*** -.13** —  
13. Gender .02 .04 -.14*** -.06 -.02 -.08 -.02 -.03 -.02 -.05 -.10* .22*** — 
M 3.11 3.15 4.95 2.43 4.84 4.55 6.45 2.27 4.19 3.85 2.31 38.36 1.41 
SD 1.18 1.13 1.11 1.20 1.29 1.23 1.05 1.32 1.33 1.26 1.40 14.83 0.49 





Intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations for study variables (Study 1b: the US).  
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Perceived Justice —             
2. External political efficacy .57*** —            
3. Internal political efficacy .02 .03 —           
4. Power distance orientation .33*** .26*** -.12** —          
5. Anger -.61*** -.48*** .12** -.31*** —         
6. Contempt -.65*** -.52*** .04 -.22*** .68*** —        
7. Voting .06 .06 .34*** -.12** .10* .03 —       
8. Radical Action -.13*** -.07 .05 .16*** .17*** .26*** -.02 —      
9. Non-institutional participation -.22*** -.10* .30*** -.24*** .35*** .27*** .32*** .37*** —     
10. Political orientation .41*** .21*** -.04 .28*** -.36*** -.31** -.14*** -.17*** -.34*** —    
11. Social dominance orientation -.39*** -.15 .06** -.48*** .33*** .27*** .12** -.05 .28*** -.57*** —   
12. Age .09* .07 .15*** .04 -.07 -.15*** .03 -.15*** -.09* .13*** -.06 —  
13. Gender -.06 -.04 -.05 -.15*** .04 -.03 .07 -.11** .14*** -.06 .18*** .07 — 
M 3.53 3.14 5.65 2.27 4.45 4.19 6.32 1.55 4.07 3.25 5.65 33.39 1.44 
SD 1.34 1.27 1.07 1.08 1.65 1.61 1.32 0.89 1.58 1.69 1.27 11.62 0.50 





Means, and standard deviations for study variables (Study 2a-c).  
 
 






High Power Distance 
M (SD) 
Low Power Distance 
M (SD) 
High Power Distance 
M (SD) 
Low Power Distance 
M (SD) 
High Power Distance 
M (SD) 
Low Power Distance 
M (SD) 
Radical Action 2.06 (1.02) 1.74 (.89) 2.78 (2.12) 2.02 (1.53) 1.79 (1.05) 1.45(1.04) 
Non-Institutional Participation 4.59 (1.43) 4.69 (1.25) 4.67 (1.73) 4.40 (1.56) 4.04 (1.79) 3.93 (1.38) 





Figure 1. The latent variables model showing coefficients for the predictors of institutional (voting) and non-institutional and violent political 
action (Study 1a: South Korea).  
Note. Dashed lines are nonsignificant paths at p > .10. Political orientation, SDO, gender and age are covariates in the model. 




Figure 2. The latent variables model showing coefficients for the predictors of institutional (voting) and non-institutional and violent political 
action (Study 1b: the US).  
Note. Dashed lines are nonsignificant paths at p > .10. Political orientation, SDO, gender and age are covariates in the model. 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, † p < .10. 
